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Abstract:  
This entry outlines the concept of interpretation in archaeology. It does so by surveying a 
variety of approaches to the problem of interpretation taken by archaeologists, including 
those representative of culture historical approaches, processual approaches and the 
collection of approaches associated with post-processual or interpretive archaeology. The 
entry ends by outlining where the concept of interpretation is in contemporary archaeological 
theory.  
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Main Text: 
An interpretation is a theoretical or narrative account of ³something´, whether it be facts, 
events, persons, or texts, that makes that ³something´ comprehensible. In archaeology, the 
³something´ in question is the archaeological record: archaeology, being the discipline that 
studies the human past through its material remains, offers interpretations of that past. 
Interpretation makes sense of archaeological evidence (Tilley 1993). Archaeologists must 
engage in an ³interpretive leap´ when moving from excavated data to final report (Trigger 
1996). They do this by way of what Gamble (2008) has called the ³archaeological 
imagination´.  
In the human sciences more generally it is possible to distinguish ³historical interpretations´ 
from ³scientific explanations´. Historical interpretations are based on human experience, 
understanding, and language whereas scientific explanations are based on observation yet are 
abstract, constructed, and theoretical. In archaeology the concept of interpretation has gone 
through a number of different theoretical phases. Each phase has bordered on historical 
interpretation or scientific explanation to varying degrees. A broadly culture-historical 
approach remains a mainstay of archaeological interpretation. Thomas (1995) argued that 
much of the work produced by academic archaeologists in the United Kingdom, for example, 
still broadly conforms to this approach. Culture history approaches in archaeology prioritize 
the gathering of data, the establishment of facts, and the creation of appropriate 
classifications of that data. An emphasis on inductive reasoning, bringing this approach into 
the border lands of scientific explanation, where the interpreter moves from their specific 
observations to making more general claims that are supported by their observations is a 
central plank of culture history approaches. It is chronological and geographical ordering of 
data that is paramount for culture-historical approaches and it is new data, rather than new 
interpretive frameworks for that data, that is believed to drive the development of 
DUFKDHRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ$VZLWQHVVWRWKLV*DPEOHQRWHVWKDW*RUGRQ&KLOGH¶V
The Dawn of European Civilisation went through six editions between 1925 and 1957. 
Interpretation, historical or otherwise, beyond what can be discerned by the attentive 
archaeologist looking out for indications of change (in both chronological and geographical 
directions) in the data of the archaeological record, is typically regarded as speculation 
(Gamble 2008, 23).  
In the 1940s and 50s, owing to a generalised cultural positivism (see saseas0471) and/or 
empiricism (see saseas0214), interpretations of the archaeological record were taken to be 
subjective; matters of opinion without lasting importance (Trigger 1996). For archaeologists, 
such as Glyn Daniel, Stuart Piggott, and Christopher Hawkes it was archaeological data that 
was taken to be central to the discipline. Whereas data is objective interpretations, by 
contrast, are shaped by intellectual fads and can be undermined by new and improved 
understanding of data. Figures like Daniel, Piggott, and Hawkes were, in part, reacting to the 
influential work of idealist philosopher and archaeologist Robin George Collingwood (1889-
1943) who had denied that facts and theories were distinct from one another. Collingwood 
argued that archaeological interpretation is an activity whereby a modern archaeologist 
attempts to relive the past in their own mind by way of their ideas: these ideas are about the 
ideas that past peoples had in their minds. It is these past ideas that shaped the archaeological 
record. By reconstructing these past mental activities that shaped events modern 
archaeologists could hope to articulate the archaeologically visible dynamics of ancient 
cultures (Trigger 1996, 303-305).  
Writing in the 1970s during the heyday of ³New´ or ³processual archaeology´David Clarke 
argued that archaeologists utilise five bodies of theory in their intellectual leaps from data to 
final report the final body of which he termed ³interpretive theory´. Clarke was sceptical of 
the broadly intuitive approach used by culture historians in the construction of their historical 
narratives. He believed that these narratives proceeded without a duly rigorous analysis of the 
archaeological data which would extract as much information on past behaviour as possible. 
Clarke went so far to suggest that such narratives represented an ³irresponsible art form´ 
(Trigger 1996, 430).  
The first body of theory noted by Clarke is ³predepositional and depositional theory´. This 
covers relations between human activity, social patterns and environmental factors, and with 
the samples and traces found in the archaeological record. The second body of theory, dubbed 
³postdepositional´, examines natural and human processes affecting the archaeological 
record. This includes factors from natural erosion to traces of plowing. Thirdly, ³retrieval 
theory´, deals with relations between what survives in the archaeological record and what is 
recovered in research. Fourthly, ³analytical theory´, deals with how the data recovered from 
the archaeological record is treated. As such, analytical theory includes varieties of 
classification and modelling, testing, and experimental studies. Finally, the fifth body of 
³interpretive theory´ concerns the relations between the archaeological patterns discerned at 
level four (analytical theory) and the unobservable ancient environmental and behavioural 
SDWWHUQVWKDWWKH\H[SUHVV$V7ULJJHUKDVSXWLW&ODUNH¶s interpretive theory ³infers the 
processes that predepositional theory explains´ 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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challenge facing archaeologists is to establish appropriate bodies of theory for each level of 
analysis. This will involve incorporating analyses from the biological and physical sciences 
as well as from archaeology since the human sciences are taken to be restricted to the 
predepositional and interpretive levels of analysis. Clarke believed that taken together in its 
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logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, would combine to create a truly scientific 
archaeological discipline (see saseas0524). 
Processual archaeology conceived of archaeology as anthropological science. It is not 
specifically allied with humanistic disciplines, such as history. Processual archaeologists 
value explanation, via methodologies modelled on the hard sciences, over description and/or 
historical interpretation. Archaeological explanations will incorporate particular observations 
of the material past drawn from the archaeological record and will incorporate these into 
cross-cultural generalizations that relate to both natural and social processes. This emphasis 
on processes is where the designation ³processual archaeology´ originates. Earlier emphasis 
on ³laws of human behaviour´ in archaeology is replaced by a concern with the formative 
processes of the archaeological record itself. Identification of regularities in the record will 
allow for inferences about processes ³to be made from material remains´ (Shanks and 
Hodder 1995, 3). Processual archaeology, which took for itself the title of ³New 
Archaeology´, aimed to discover knowledge of the past that, in aspiration, was objective, 
neutral, timeless, and singular. Despite these aspirations the fate of interpretation in 
archaeology did not stop there. Starting in the 1970s an alternative to this approach began to 
develop. This alternative tendency was named ³post-processual archaeology´ by Ian Hodder 
in 1985. In 1991 it was dubbed ³interpretive archaeology´, again, by Hodder (Trigger 1996). 
The epithet ³interpretive archaeology´ is intended to be a positive label for a number of 
diverse approaches grouped under this banner in place of the lesser relational title ³post-
processual´ (Shanks and Hodder 1995). Hodder described interpretive archaeology as being 
characterised by a ³hermeneutic method´ and by 1995 he and Michael Shanks suggested that 
the term ³interpretation´ itself is the term that will help to clarify current debates in 
archaeological theory between processual and post-processual archaeology in the English 
language.   
Shanks and Hodder describe interpretive archaeologies as follows: archaeology is a material 
practice in the present that ³makes things´, interpretations, narratives, reports, and so on, out 
of the archaeological record. These ³artefacts´ are no less truthful for being produced by 
researchers. In the foreground of the archaeological enterprise is the interpreter, the 
archaeologist. Interpretation is a form of practice that requires the interpreter to take 
responsibility for their interpretations. Like other social practices archaeology is concerned 
with ³meanings´. That is, the job of archaeology is to make sense of things and because of 
this archaeology with be inherently interpretive. Importantly, because it is an interpretive 
practice the project of archaeology will be ongoing: no final authoritative or definitive 
account of the past is possible. As a process concerned with meaning or understanding, the 
concern with causal explanation is diminished in interpretive approaches. Different 
interpretations of the same subject matter are possible: multivocality (see saseas0466) is 
embraced and so a plurality of different archaeological interpretations can be produced. 
These interpretations will reflect different needs and desires. Interpretation is creative (see 
saseas0140) but it is not uncritical. The needs and desires of interpreters and of groups and 
communities who have an interest in the material past must be recognised (Shanks and 
Hodder 1995, 5; Jones and Alberti 2013).  
The question ³what is interpretation?´ is still an open one in archaeology (Jones and Alberti 
2013). Recently, over the last decade or so, theoretically orientated archaeologists have 
moved away from asking broadly epistemological questions, such as ³what constitutes 
archaeological knowledge?´, and toward asking ontological (see saseas0420) ones, such as 
³what is the nature of archaeological thought?´. What Lucas (2012) has called the ³current 
interpretive dilemma´ is bound up with questioning the underlying ontological commitments 
and metaphysical assumptions of archaeological discourse. Rather than seeking to remove 
interpretation as the primary goal of archaeology contemporary theoretical archaeologists 
seek to question the nature of the interpretive process and of the arFKDHRORJLVW¶VUROHLQLW
This emphasis on questioning follows the identification of a worry that one of the 
consequences of the emergence of interpretive archaeology, which foregrounded the role of 
the interpreting archaeologist in the present, was to construct a vision of past human agents as 
essentially ³interpreting subjects´. While archaeologists might always aim at providing an 
interpretation of the archaeological record archaeological questioning has now recognised 
that interpretation and reality are co-emergent. That is, all practices, including archaeology, 
are taken to be ³fully relational and constitutive´ (Jones and Alberti 2013, 15). This change in 
perspective in contemporary theory moves away from placing the interpreting subject, as an 
individual identity, at the centre of things. This move is also sceptical of the view that the 
human subject is the only being capable of action and interpretation. Human subjects too are 
taken to be fully relational and performative constructions. The interpreting subject is 
rethought as relational and as something that emerges within a set of unfolding relationships. 
The shift from epistemology to ontology in archaeology does not herald the ³death of 
interpretation´ or the ³death of the interpreting subject´ but it does place emphasis on the 
very constitution of ³humanity´, taken as a specific subjectivity, in both the past and the 
present, as well as questioning the constitution of archaeological interpretation. Rather than 
representing a radical break with earlier interpretive archaeologies recent theorists have 
instead revisited a shared group of influences, such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, 
Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari et al, with fresh eyes, questions and so possibilities for 
interpretation.  
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